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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
ably capable of two constructions, the construction which limits the restriction,
rather than the one which extends it, should be adopted.19
In construing the restriction, the Court was influenced by the fact that
plaintiff's interpretation would result in over fifty-five per cent of the total area
of the lot being unavailable for building, while defendant's interpretation would
render only twenty-two per cent of the lot unusable. Plaintiff's contention that
the front of the lot could be determined as the side toward which the building
faced was rejected, apparently because "the front of a building is not determined
20
by the position in which that building is erected on the lot."
After finding that the defendant had not violated the setback restriction, as
correctly construed, the Court supplied a second ground for reversal; 21 the parties
had executed a bilateral release.22 There would seem to be a construction problem
here also, but if so it was ignored. The Court seems to have gone a little out of its
way in this case to express its views on the narrow constitution of restrictions,
perhaps for the benefit of the lower courts, which had not hesitated to grant the
plaintiff his injunction.
Percentage-of-SalesLease
In every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair
)2 4
dealing.23 In Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Tailored Woman, Inc.,
defendant leased the first three floors of a building on a percentage of gross sales
basis and later leased the fifth floor on a straight rental basis. The tenant moved
its fur department from the lower floors to the fifth floor. The Court dejected the
landlord's claim that this breached implied covenants against diversion of sales,
and decided that all that was necessary was for the tenant to conduct a women's
clothing store of the same general character as when it entered the lease. The
landlord also claimed that the percentage rental was to be paid on sales made
"on, in and from the demised premises;' and since customers entered through
the lower floors these sales were "from" the lower floors. The Court held that
sales made to customers sent to the fifth floor by salespeople on the lower floors
19. Schoonmaker v. Heckscher, 171 App. Div. 148, 157 N. Y. Supp. 75 (Ist
Dep't), aff'd 218 N. Y. 722, 113 N. E. 1066 (1916).
20. 307 N. Y. 575 582, 122 N. E. 2d 918, 922 (1954). See Rollins v. Armstrong,
251 N. Y. 349, 167 N. E. 466 (1929).
21. A third ground for denial of injunctive relief was the failure to prove
damages; the uncontradicted expert testimony was to the effect that the house
as built actually enhanced the value of neighboring property.
22. "And whereas the parties now desire to release each other from any
future liability arising from said agreement . . . the parties ... hereby release
each other ...
from all future liability . . ." (italics supplied.)
23. Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Oo., 263 N. Y. 79, 188 N. E. 163 (1933).
24. 309 N. Y. 248, 128 N. E. 2d 401 (1955).
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were sales "from" the main store and subject to percentage rent. However, some
fur sales were not made "from" the main store, and these were not subject to
percentage rent.
The dissent felt that removal of the fur department was a breach of faith
even though the lease did not specifically require operation of a fur department.
"A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an
obligation,' imperfectly expressed. ' 25
Where a store was rented on a percentage of gross sales basis, the lessee was
held liable for the percentage on total gross sales even though he moved two
departments into an adjoining building. 2 It has been held that a tenant is not
justified in removing its most lucrative departments to other premises in an
effort to diminish rent which was based on percentage of gross sales. 27 In these
cases, however, there appeared to be an intent to reduce the rent coupled with an
actual reduction. In the instant case the tenant moved because it was necessary
to expand, and in the lower court's decision 28 it was pointed out that sales actually
increased, resulting in higher rent to the landlord.
Distinguishing between sales made as a result of referrals from salespeople
on lower floors and other sales is more difficult to rationalize. The fur department
was advertised downstairs, customers had to board the elevators on the lower
floors, and furs were stored and prepared there. It would seem that these sales,
also, were "from" the main store.
Reopening Tax Foreclosure Defaults
City of New York v. Nelson 29 presented the problem of whether relief may
be afforded a party under section 108 of the Civil Practice Act 30 from a default
judgment in an in rem tax foreclosure action obtained pursuant to the provisions
of the Administrative Code of the City of New York.3 ' The Court held that
section 108 provided for no such relief, even though the city acquired properties
assessed at $52,000 for a total tax arrearage of $887, and though it was no fault of
the owner that the tax was unpaid. The Court felt, "the power to afford relief
25. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordan, 222 N. Y. 88, 91, 118 N. E. 214 (1917).
26. Cissna Loan Co. v. Baron, 149 Wash. 386, 270 Pac. 1022 (1928).
27. Dunham & Co. v. 26 East State Street Realty Co., 134 N. J. Eq. 237,
35 A. 2d
28.
29.
30.

40 (1943).
123 N. Y. S. 2d 349 (1953).
309 N. Y. 94, 127 N. E. 2d 827 (1955).
N. Y. CIV. PRAc. ,Acr § 108, allows a court to relieve a party from a

judgment taken against him "through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect."
31. Tit. D, c. 17.

